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A Matter of National Importance: The Persistent 
Inefficiency of Deceptive Advertising Class Actions  
Abstract 
Deceptive advertising class actions have recently become increasingly 
popular. However, an examination of their functioning reveals that they are 
inefficient for all parties involved: plaintiffs, defendants, and the court system itself. 
In response to concern that cases of national importance were getting mired in state 
courts, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), a statute 
that purported to streamline class action procedure. But CAFA can only do so 
much in the deceptive advertising realm, where the entrenched state law nature of 
the claim continues to stymie efficient and effective litigation. Settlements remain 
challenging and often unsatisfying for both plaintiffs and defendants, and 
continued litigation of the class action often results in duplicative litigation and 
inconsistent precedent, with forum-shopping and jurisdictional manipulations a 
matter of course.  
In this day and age, most advertising is nationwide and most harm suffered is 
thus also nationwide. This Article argues that there is therefore no reason for 
deceptive advertising to remain a state cause of action. Further, deceptive 
advertising is not the sort of injury that should be vindicated by class action at all, 
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I. Introduction 
Class actions have fueled debate throughout their history. Depending on who you 
ask, they are either the premier vehicle for the vindication of the rights of the little 
guy or a blackmail tool to extort settlements for frivolous claims.1 But whatever they 
are, they are undeniably popular right now.2  
Deceptive advertising class actions are no exception to the rising tide of class 
action litigation.3 These class actions, however, ably illustrate how the current 
system benefits no one, neither plaintiffs, defendants, nor the judiciary. Such class 
actions almost universally involve national ad campaigns which, if harmful, are 
surely harmful nationwide.4 However, the deceptive advertising cause of action is a 
state one.5 This results in a singularly inefficient tangle of warring litigations, forum-
shopping, topsy-turvy incentives, and haphazard fact-finding, resulting in 
inconsistent precedent and unhappy plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.6 Defendants 
may frequently find themselves between a Scylla of litigating the same case dozens 
of times and a Charybdis of settling the same case dozens of times; plaintiffs 
frequently find themselves so indifferent to the final outcome as to not even bother 
to claim their damages; and courts frequently find themselves presiding over 
duplicative cases.7 
This Article argues that the current system makes little sense and serves little 
purpose and that deceptive advertising, as was originally supposed when it was first 
conceived, should be entrusted to regulators to police. Part II examines deceptive 
 1. See, e.g., Lloyd Milliken, Jr., Fixing the Broken Class Action Lawsuit System, 47 RES GESTAE 19, 19 (2003) 
(explaining the purpose of class actions is to make courts accessible to the “little guy” who has an issue with a 
more economically powerful company); see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 103 (2007) 
(noting class actions “could be used to ‘blackmail’ defendants who could not risk the possible ruin of a jury 
verdict into agreeing to settlements which benefited mostly the plaintiff’s counsel”). 
 2. See, e.g., Mandi L. Williams, The History of Daubert and its Effect on Toxic Tort Class Action 
Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 200 (2003) (“Over the past decade, class actions have become increasingly 
popular.”); Christopher J. Willis, Aggregation of Punitive Damages in Diversity Class Actions: Will the Real 
Amount in Controversy Please Stand Up?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 775 (1997) (stating the class action device is 
becoming “ever more popular,” and state law class actions are increasing in frequency). 
 3. See, e.g., infra notes 25–26. 
 4. See, e.g., Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012 
WL 1079716, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 
2012 WL 834125, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 581 (9th Cir. 2012); Pilgrim v. Universal 
Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2011); Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 540 (C.D. Cal. 
2012). 
 6. See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 837, 837–38 (1995) (citing duplicative litigation activity, multiple trials, inconsistent outcomes, and 
incentives to distort the operation of traditional legal processes as some of the setbacks of class actions); Vance 
G. Camisa, The Constitutional Right to Solicit Potential Class Members in a Class Action, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 95, 114 
(1989–90) (“This situation presents a very real opportunity for forum shopping and its attendant inequities to 
play a major role in class actions.”). 
 7. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 837. 
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advertising as a cause of action.8 Part III turns to the class action as a litigation 
procedure.9 Part IV analyzes the ways in which deceptive advertising class actions 
fail plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary.10 Finally, Part V considers alternatives 
to the current framework, proposing that the system should return to its roots and 
the regulatory scheme should suffice.11  
II. Deceptive Advertising as a Cause of Action 
Initially, in the realm of the shadowy historical common law from which the 
Lanham Act claimed its purpose, the action of deceptive advertising was intended 
to address the situation of a seller in possession of counterfeit goods who told 
consumers they were bona fide goods.12 It was a slant on the “passing off” cause of 
action.13 In the early years, courts kept a tight rein on the standing requirements 
imposed on such causes of action, determined not to “open a Pandora’s box of 
vexatious litigation.”14 As commentators have explained, “In effect, such judicial 
statements really amount to saying, ‘Yes, there may be false advertising here, but 
you can’t complain about it. Let the government do it.’”15 
To paraphrase an old advertising campaign, deceptive advertising as a cause of 
action has “come a long way,”16 both in breadth of the injury that the cause of 
action captures and in the standing permitted by those suing to avenge the injury.17 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:1 (4th ed. 
2012) (“[T]his is a variation of the ancient prohibition against passing off one’s goods as the goods of 
another.”); see also Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1051 et seq. (2006)). 
 13. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12. Passing off remains a cause of action today, most often used in “cases 
where defendant has made an unauthorized substitution of the goods of one manufacturer when the goods of 
another manufacturer were ordered by the customer.” Id. § 1:12. 
 14. N.Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277, 278 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890). 
 15. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 27:2. 
 16. Stuart Elliot, The Media Business Advertising: A Possible Impact of Thomas Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
1991, at D3 (describing the 1970s ad campaign by Philip Morris which featured confident, liberated women 
smoking Virginia Slims, congratulating them with the slogan, “You've come a long way, baby”). 
 17. Courts, naturally, still examine standing in the context of false advertising causes of actions, and the 
courts sometimes do find the case for standing to be too nebulous. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 
575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding no “identifiable basis for standing” in a case where membership in the class 
required only the purchase of the product in question). However, such rulings are countered by opposite 
outcomes in nearly identical cases. See, e.g., Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(identifying as a class “all persons who purchased the Men’s Vitamins in the State of California . . . .”); In re 
Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of “all persons who … bought one or more 
Nutella® products in the state of California”); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 380 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (certifying a class where membership in the class required only the purchase of the product in 
question); Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 691 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (granting a motion for 
Class Certification wherein the class was “[a]ll Florida consumers who purchased Enfamil® LIPIL®”); Kelly v. 
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Courts no longer appear to think that the government ought to be the primary 
defense against deceptive advertising.18 Indeed, the “Pandora’s box of vexatious 
litigation” seems to have been quite decisively opened — and possibly as 
irreversibly as that of the myth.  
The history of deceptive advertising is one of expansionism. Tucked into § 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act and originally envisioned “as a minor, but useful section,” the 
courts’ interpretations of the section prodded it into singular importance in unfair 
competition jurisprudence.19 However, standing to sue for deceptive advertising 
under § 43(a) has traditionally been denied to consumers.20 Federal courts voiced 
the fear that permitting consumers standing under § 43(a) “would lead to a 
veritable flood of claims brought in already overtaxed federal district courts, while 
adequate private remedies for consumer protection, which to date have been left 
almost exclusively to the States, are readily at hand.”21 This stance left the door open 
for state courts to fill the gap, fracturing deceptive advertising into dozens of 
smaller battles as part of one larger war.  
States became the controllers of consumer deceptive advertising causes of 
action.22 Whether brought in state or federal courts, the complaints rest on state 
statutes, like the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act23 or the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.24 If the complaint is brought 
in federal court, it is based on diversity jurisdiction, not federal question 
Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 567–69 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (receiving Class Certification on purchased products 
for settlement purposes). 
 18. But see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (“Moreover, as an administrative 
agency which deals continually with cases in the area, the [Federal Trade] Commission is often in a better 
position than are courts to determine when a practice is ‘deceptive’ . . . .”). 
 19. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27:7; see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).  
 20. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 27:39; see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).  
 21. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Lanham Act § 43(a), 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).  
 22. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 27:114–115 (discussing the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and 
little Federal Trade Commission Acts). Plaintiffs have also resorted to common law unjust enrichment and 
breach of warranty causes of action to vindicate their rights. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 
581, 587 (9th Cir. 2012); Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2011); Montanez v. 
Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09-7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL 6757875, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011); 
In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 556; Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 567; Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 502 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06-cv-06634-JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
20, 2011); Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012 WL 
1079716, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012); Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 272 F.R.D. 477, 481 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 543 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-
1178-Orl-28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 634 
(S.D. Cal. 2011); Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 691; Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 
WL 3119452, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 692 (S.D. Fla. 2010); 
In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 05 C 4724, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005); Oshana, 225 F.R.D. at 578. 
 23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq. (West 2012). 
 24. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq. (West 2012). 
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jurisdiction.25 The spotlight in the field of deceptive advertising solidly belongs to 
the states. 
The state specific remedies for deceptive advertising stand in stark contrast to 
the nationwide harm they are meant to address.26 An idea that may have seemed 
logical in 1971 looks less logical by the dawning of the twenty-first century mass 
media. The proposition that any one state has more of an interest than any other 
state in regulating nationwide advertisements is nonsensical when the harm to 
consumers stems from cohesive national ad campaigns. The corollary that 
consumers in one state are harmed in a different way by the same advertisement 
than consumers in any other state is equally ludicrous. 
In short, the state-centric nature of consumer deceptive advertising actions feels 
like a historical curiosity, a relic from a time when deceptive advertising sported a 
different character altogether and was thought to be the primary preoccupation of 
competitors, not consumers, intended as a backstop to government regulations. 




 25. See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 589; Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2006); Brill v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005); Bruno, 280 F.R.D. at 545; Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. 
Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *4; Wolph, 272 F.R.D. at 485; In re Yasmin 
and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *8 
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012); Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 636; Fine v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-01848 SJO 
(CFOx), 2010 WL 3632469, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010); Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 2:06-
CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009); Yeroushalmi, 2005 WL 2083008, at *1; 
Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Oshana, 225 F.R.D. at 583. 
 26. See Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 
1616912, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (reviewing state class certification requests by Plaintiffs seeking 
remedies for injuries induced by a flammable hair styling product that had not been appropriately labeled and 
was sold in large quantities across the country); Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *1 (relying upon the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, among other statutes, to redress a class’s deceptive advertising claim involving a 
probiotic health product with a nationwide marketing campaign); Gianino, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (denying 
Plaintiffs’ motion to apply California law to a class certification of plaintiffs contesting the nationwide 
marketing of the product, Emergen-C); Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *8 (applying Florida law to a deceptive 
advertising suit because Florida had a strong interest in protecting its citizens, while admitting that the 
misrepresentations “could have ‘emanated’ from a variety of locations”); In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 562 
(certifying a California class of persons who purchased Nutella products that had been nationally marketed as 
part of a “balanced breakfast”); Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 568 (applying California’s False Advertising Act, California’s 
Unfair Competition Law, California’s Deceptive Practices Act, and Iowa’s Consumer Fraud Act to a case for 
remedies wherein the product was sold across a nationwise market); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-
GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding that Plaintiffs could not assert that 
their claim was limited to activities occurring in California, and that as a result, the class could not be certified); 
Fitzpatrick, 263 F.R.D. at 691 (discussing the nationwide marketing campaign to sell Yo-Plus yogurt that was 
being addressed only by the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act); In re Sears, 2007 WL 4287511 at 
*1 (discussing how “Made in USA” was an inappropriate label for mostly foreign supplied Craftsman tools and 
how the label was perpetuated throughout the entire country). But see Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 948 (noting that the 
ads in question were not uniform from state to state). 
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III. The Deceptive Advertising Class Action 
While a deceptive advertising cause of action does not have to be a class action, it is 
an undeniably popular choice.27 Most state class actions resemble federal class 
actions procedurally.28 In addition, even though focused on state law, many 
deceptive advertising class actions are litigated in the federal court system and 
therefore governed by federal procedure.29 An examination of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 is thus instructive in revealing the inefficiencies of deceptive 
advertising class actions.30 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
The class action is supposed to be a win-win-win situation. It is supposed to 
increase judicial efficiency by consolidating many cases into one, promote the 
litigation of injustices that might not be worthwhile otherwise, and enable 
defendants to settle common issues quickly and efficiently in one fell swoop.31 “As 
one state supreme court observed, the modern class action ‘is a procedural device 
that was adopted with the goals of economies of time, effort and expense, 
uniformity of decisions, the promotion of efficiency and fairness in handling large 
numbers of similar claims.’”32 In this way, class actions are supposed to benefit 
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts themselves.  
Rule 23(a) sets forth four “prerequisites” for a class action:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
 27. This Article focuses on class actions brought for deceptive or misleading advertising, and it does not 
discuss class actions relying exclusively on other causes of action, such as breach of warranty. See, e.g., Walewski, 
2012 WL 834125, at *1. 
 28. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary 
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1500 (2008). 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. See Kalee DiFazio, Note, CAFA’s Impact on Forum Shopping and the Manipulation of the Civil Justice 
System, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 133, 135–36 (2012); see also O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09–
8063 PSG (CWx), 2011 WL 4352458, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) (“Class certification is appropriate when it 
‘saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class 
member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].’”) 
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)); Burbank, supra note 28, at 1487; Steven 
B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1137 
(2005); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 79. 
 32. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (7th ed. 2010) (quoting In re W. Va. 
Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 62 (W. Va. 2003)). 
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the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.33  
These prerequisites are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequate representation.34 Once these prerequisites have been 
fulfilled, the class action then must fit into one of the three categories enumerated 
by 23(b): (1) individual litigations would carry the risk of either inconsistent 
judgments or the foreclosure of subsequent litigants’ rights; (2) relief is sought for 
conduct that is consistent to the class as a whole; or (3) questions common to the 
class predominate over individual questions and a class action would be superior 
to all other methods of adjudication.35 
The idea of class actions as a vehicle for litigation has existed for decades. In 
1937, it was formally adopted from Equity Rule 38, which explicitly recognized 
that a class action could exist where numerous persons shared a common 
interest.36 Thus, the numerosity and commonality requirements are well-
entrenched in American jurisprudence, although the initial motivation behind 
this Rule seemed to be to make sure that unincorporated associations could sue 
and be sued, despite their lack of status as a legal entity.37 The typical class action 
today, brought by a loose coalition of people who have never met, is a very 
different creature.  
From the very beginning, class actions have enjoyed a reputation for working 
better in theory than in practice. The initial incarnation of Rule 23 “proved 
obscure and uncertain,” hindered by terms that proved challenging to the courts 
to define and interpret.38 As a result, in 1966 the Rule was overhauled in an 
attempt to add clarity and predictability to class actions. There was also concern 
that the original Rule did not “assure procedural fairness,” especially when it 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 34. See, e.g., Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 
1616912, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012); Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 
551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Montanez v. Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09-7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL 
6757875, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *2 
(D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011); Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10-03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 4, 2011); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 
2011); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 637 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 
2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006) (note to Subdivision (a)). 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006) (clause (1), Joint, Common, or 
Secondary Right). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006) (amendment difficulties with the original 
rule).  
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came to notification of class members.39 The 1966 amendment, by overhauling 
the original Rule, intended to: 
[D]escribe[] in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class 
actions; provide[] that all class actions maintained to the end as such will 
result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of 
the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refer[] 
to the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these 
actions.40 
B. Issues with Class Actions 
1. Settlement 
Despite these amendments, problems — whether real or perceived — persisted 
with class actions. For one thing, there was a perception that for the majority of the 
time class actions only benefited plaintiffs’ attorneys, who collected enormous fees 
from settlements.41 Indeed, some plaintiffs’ attorneys form their entire practice 
around the bringing of such class actions.42 In many cases, the perceived goal is not 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. LEGIS. 76, 76 
(2009) (“[Class actions] contribute to the skyrocketing number of lawsuits filed. Given the small amount that 
each individual plaintiff has at stake in the lawsuit, no one benefits but the lawyers who bring the lawsuits. They 
are viewed as nothing more than ‘money generators’ for lawyers.”); see also Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. Civ. 2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009) (“[T]he only persons 
likely to benefit from a class action in this case are class counsel . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that proposed class 
counsel had “prosecuted hundreds of class actions”). Some courts have issued sharp criticisms of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who drive the class action litigations instead of soliciting the plaintiffs active involvement. See In re 
Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2012 WL 865041, 
at *17–18 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (finding a named plaintiff to be an inadequate representative because she was 
a close friend of class counsel’s, who recruited her to the litigation); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-
GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (“Defendants correctly note that there is at 
least some basis for concern about whether Plaintiffs are ‘not simply lending [their] name to a suit controlled 
entirely by the class attorney.’” (quoting Beck v. Status Game Corp., 89 Civ. 2923, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9978, 
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1995) (quoting 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1766 (2d ed. 
1986)))); id. at *13 (“Both Plaintiffs in their depositions exhibited a lack of familiarity with the case. Both 
testified they did not understand the differences between the original complaint and the SAC or why the 
changes were made.”); Sanchez, 2009 WL 1514435, at *3 (“Such a ‘cart before the horse’ approach to litigation is 
not the proper mechanism for the vindication of legal rights.”). This criticism perhaps reflects a concern that 
unsavory practices might be underway. See Red, 2011 WL 4599833, at *14 (“Much more troubling than this, 
they also note that The Weston Firm's former co-counsel testified under oath that Mr. Weston had (1) offered a 
‘kickback’ to an employee's roommate in return for serving as a named plaintiff in a class action; (2) promised a 
‘finder's fee’ to his employee in return for ‘signing up’ her roommate as a named plaintiff; and (3) agreed to 
compensate the firm's non-lawyer employees with settlement proceeds on a percentage basis.”). However, 
others appear unconcerned by the practice. See O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09–8063 PSG (CWx), 2011 
WL 4352458, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). Additionally, there have been unsavory accusations sometimes 
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to litigate but to extract a settlement with a generous provision for attorneys’ fees.43 
“[C]onventional wisdom is that class actions are ‘Frankenstein monsters’ whose 
very existence allows plaintiffs to engage in judicial blackmail inducing defendants 
to settle frivolous claims.”44 Even if the claims were legitimate, too often, the story 
was that class members received mere pennies or coupons of little to no value, 
which they seldom even bothered to collect.45  
2. Jurisdictional 
In addition to no longer benefitting consumers and being seen as tools of 
jurisprudential blackmail,46 class actions were also perceived as encouraging 
jurisdictional games that prejudiced defendants and represented a drag on judicial 
efficiency.47 There was concern that these jurisdictional games were causing cases of 
national importance to get trapped in state court, leading to states exercising undue 
amounts of influence over injuries that were truly nationwide in scope.48 This was a 
singularly inefficient way to adjudicate in a court system founded on stare decisis: 
courts got caught up in sticky questions of issue and claim preclusion49 and 
defendants found themselves serially addressing the issues at hand.50 Such was 
lobbied at plaintiffs’ class action law firms. See, e.g., Pre-Paid Legal Servs. Inc. v. Gilmer Law Firm, 260 Fed. 
Appx. 731 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the action of a class action law firm wherein the lawyers were accused of 
tortuous interference with a business relationship). 
 43. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1137 (“Over time, class actions have become the equivalent of 
high-stakes litigation poker. The potential costs of losing often force companies to fold their hands and settle 
rather than call the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s bluff.”); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, at § 1:3 (“Class actions are an 
attractive option for plaintiffs’ lawyers’ for the same reason that they pose a tremendous hazard to defendants—
the consolidation of numerous claims into one action multiplies the potential damages award, often to a figure 
so large that it exerts irresistible pressure on defendants to agree to substantial settlements for claims that they 
would be willing to litigate to judgment if the liability risk were less daunting.”); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 78, 
103. But see Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 385, 404 (Apr. 2005) (“This argument, however, does not account for the existence of Rule 11 
protections against frivolous lawsuits. If the defendants are correct in saying that too many class 
actions nowadays are ‘meritless,’ then why don’t they simply utilize a motion to dismiss to eliminate frivolous 
class actions? Moreover, if a suit is frivolous, it will not survive a Rule 11 motion whether it was filed in a state 
or a federal court.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 44. Ellis, supra note 41, at 76 (internal citations omitted). 
 45. See id. at 92; Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 
1599 (2008); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 
2011). 
 46. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 103. 
 47. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 133; see also Ellis, supra note 41, at 89 (calling class actions the 
“messiest” part of the judicial system); Erichson, supra note 45, at 1596–97; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 78, 80, 103, 
136. 
 48. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 388; Milliken, supra note 1, at 19. 
 49. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1509 (“Contemporary class action practice seems to confound the basic 
assumptions of preclusion law by preferring multiple cases to just one.”); MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, at § 1:1. 
 50. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 133, 142; see also 151 CONG. REC. H735 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Cannon); Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (“[T]he filing of a single class action in a state 
court often leads to a number of ‘copycat’ cases being filed in other jurisdictions.”) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 
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especially the case in deceptive advertising class action lawsuits, which, although 
typically involving a nationwide issue, orbited around disjointed state law.  
Because of the state law nature of deceptive advertising, in order for a deceptive 
advertising consumer class action to be brought in federal court and to be subject to 
Rule 23, diversity jurisdiction has to be satisfied. Traditionally, this required the 
satisfaction of two elements: (1) diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and 
the defendants, and (2) an amount in controversy higher than the statutorily 
defined minimum.51 In the case of a class action, these elements could be easily 
thwarted. The federal requirement of complete diversity meant that clever plaintiffs’ 
attorneys could defeat federal jurisdiction merely by choosing a named plaintiff 
with the same citizenship as one of the defendants.52 Because of the national breadth 
of the advertising campaigns at issue, this does not normally present a hurdle. 
Furthermore, because of the decentralized nature of the individual harm present in 
a class action, it was a simple matter for plaintiffs’ attorneys to assert that none of 
the plaintiffs’ claims ever met the requisite amount in controversy, which was 
generally set high enough to ensure that minor disputes did not clutter the federal 
court system.53 Finally, because diversity jurisdiction was traditionally intended to 
prevent out-of-state defendants from being victimized by an unfamiliar court 
system,54 defendants are not allowed to remove a case that would otherwise satisfy 
the diversity jurisdiction requirements if the case is brought in a defendants’ home 
state.55 For this reason, plaintiffs’ attorneys could defeat federal jurisdiction by filing 
in the state court of the defendant’s citizenship.56 Again, because of the nationwide 
sprawl of the harm, consumer deceptive advertising class actions are generally 
intensely flexible cases.57 Forum-shopping state courts is a fairly easy task in this 
context.58  
S1248-49 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist)); Burbank, supra note 28, at 1509; Timothy Kerr, Cleaning Up One 
Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class Actions, Federal Courts’ Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 219 (2006); Milliken, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (providing the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction). 
 52. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1517–18; DiFazio, supra note 31, at 140–41; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 
81. 
 53. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 141; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 
549 (2005) (holding that if one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement then supplemental 
jurisdiction can be had over the claims of other plaintiffs); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining that only 
minimal complete diversity is required in class actions). 
 54. See Burbank, supra note 28, at 1460; Ellis, supra note 41, at 108. 
 55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006). 
 56. See id.; Burbank, supra note 28, at 1517–18; DiFazio, supra note 31, at 141. 
 57. See, e.g., Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11–cv–1178–Orl–28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *8 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012) (noting that, because defendant did business nationwide, “the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions to any particular member of the purported class could have ‘emanated’ from a 
variety of locations”). 
 58. Evidence of such activities can be gleaned from the unusual amount of class actions filed in some state 
courts as opposed to others. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 93 (“An example of one such jurisdiction is Madison 
County, Illinois. Citing the large numbers of class actions filed even where there is no evidence that the 
A Matter of National Importance 
128 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
C. CAFA 
With class actions exploding as a litigation vehicle,59 the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA) sought to address both the perceived issues of unfair settlements and 
jurisdictional shortcomings.60 
1. Settlement 
As far as the allegedly unfair settlements went, CAFA provided judges with 
assistance in their required evaluation of settlements.61 In order to make sure that 
class actions do not devolve into collusion between defendants’ and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys at the expense of the class’s interest, Rule 23 has always required court 
approval for settlements.62 The court must determine that the settlement is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” in order for such settlement to be acceptable.63 Rule 23 
does not specify further what the court’s gatekeeper function in this respect is,64 but 
in practice courts tend to review settlements to make sure they are “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate” for the class, rather than for all of the parties involved in the 
litigation.65 CAFA provided more guidance in some respects, especially with regard 
residents of that county are ‘somehow cursed or more plagued by injuries than the average citizen,’ one 
Congressman suggested that the only reasonable explanation was ‘aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to 
find courts and judges who will act as willing accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases 
and setting policy for the entire country.’” (referencing Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner))). The number of class actions filed against Fortune 500 companies in state courts increased by 
more than 1,000% in the 1990s, as opposed to a 338% increase in federal courts. See Hantler et al., supra note 
31, at 1137 (noting that this “reflect[ed] the belief that plaintiffs are more likely to obtain and prevail on 
questionable class actions in state courts”); see also Ellis, supra note 41, at 92 (noting the perception that state 
courts are more likely to certify a class). 
 59. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1137 (noting the significant increase of class actions in the 1990’s). 
 60. See S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 4 (2005) (acknowledging the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and the abuse 
of class action settlements). 
 61. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 105–07 (discussing the new mechanisms and requirements for judicial 
evaluation of settlements). 
 62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (2006); Kerr, supra note 50, at 219 (“Class counsel may collude with 
defendants and their attorneys, against class interests, in order to increase their prospects of being the lucky 
attorney to collect fees, and, thus allow defendants forum-shopping opportunities.”); id. at 224–25. 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 64. Even the committee notes accompanying the initial implementation of this rule provided no guidance 
for the curious court, stating simply, “subdivision (e) requires approval of the court, after notice, for the 
dismissal or compromise of any class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006) 
(Subdivision (d)). The 2003 committee notes attempt to expand on this, suggesting that the court look to In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1988), and the 
Manual for Complex Litigation for guidance, Fed. Judicial Centr., Manual for Complex Litig. 172 (Judge Stanley 
Marcus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004). FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 2003 (2006) (Committee Notes of 
Rules- 2003 Amendment, Paragraph (1)). 
 65. See Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 636 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“In approving a class action 
settlement, a district court must ensure fairness to all members of the class presented for certification.” 
(emphasis added) (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003))); Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 
277 F.R.D. 564, 570 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (“When making this determination, ‘the district court acts as a fiduciary, 
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to the coupon settlements that had attracted the most ire prior to CAFA.66 CAFA 
also limited or prohibited other types of settlement (e.g., so-called “net loss” 
settlements in which the plaintiffs had to pay class counsel a fee that resulted in a 
net loss, and settlements where geography dictated recovery amounts).67 Finally, 
CAFA established requirements to notify government officials of the settlement, 
introducing an additional “layer of independent oversight” beyond the court.68 
2. Jurisdictional 
As for jurisdiction, CAFA expanded federal jurisdiction to include class actions, 
attempting to close the loopholes that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been wiggling 
through.69 Among other things, federal courts could now exercise jurisdiction over 
any class action suit where the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, 
regardless of the amount of individual harm to each class member, as long as the 
class had over one hundred members.70 If a single plaintiff was diverse from any of 
the defendants, then diversity jurisdiction was satisfied, so it no longer mattered if 
plaintiffs’ attorneys tried to get clever with named plaintiffs.71 CAFA also permitted 
a defendant to remove class actions from state courts even if they had been filed in 
the defendant’s state of citizenship.72 
IV. Deceptive Advertising Class Actions:  
Still Broken After CAFA 
If class actions were broken before CAFA, then deceptive advertising class actions, 
at least, remain broken in CAFA’s wake. CAFA’s clarification of settlement scrutiny 
does not strip class action settlement of the unique challenges it presents — or 
eliminate the perception that class actions are used as a blackmail tool to extort 
money for frivolous claims. And CAFA’s attempt to expand federal jurisdiction 
serving as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.’” (quoting In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery 
Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005))). 
 66. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 105.  
 67. See id. at 106. 
 68. Id. at 106–07. 
 69. See Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05–223–AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 
July 11, 2005) (“This result is further supported by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s direction that ‘[when] a 
federal court is uncertain about whether “all matters in controversy” in a purported class action “do not in the 
aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000,” the court should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over 
the case.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 102–14, at *42 (1991), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 40)); see also id. at *2 
(noting that allegations specifically to circumvent jurisdiction were the target of CAFA). CAFA also maintains a 
number of exceptions to federal jurisdiction over class actions, meant to ensure that truly state-specific class 
actions remain in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2006). These are of limited relevance to the topic of 
this Article. 
 70. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81–82 (noting the change in the amount in controversy requirement). 
 71. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5) (2006); DiFazio, supra note 31, at 134; Ellis, supra note 41, at 101; 
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81. 
 72. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 142; Erichson, supra note 45, at 1598; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 82.  
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cannot correct the underlying difficulty of trying to redress a nationwide harm with 
a state statute, which results in inconsistent precedents, inefficient statewide classes, 
and continued jurisdictional shenanigans.73 
CAFA was intended to improve the functioning of the class action, making it, as 
it was always supposed to be, a win-win-win for all involved.74 However, deceptive 
advertising class actions have continued to operate against the best interests of 
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.75 
A. Settlement 
Settlements, far more frequently than class actions, often achieve the win-win-win 
situation that class actions are supposed to achieve: an acceptable outcome to both 
plaintiffs and defendants while unclogging busy courts.76 And the particular quirks 
of class actions initially make settlement look particularly inviting for both plaintiffs 
and defendants.77 Class actions are inherently more complex than an ordinary 
lawsuit, requiring much more labor over the course of the litigation and therefore 
higher litigation costs than a regular case.78 Judgments against defendants can be 
enormous.79 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, meanwhile, frequently do not get paid unless they 
win and may therefore be facing a huge monetary loss if they take a case to trial and 
fail to win.80 Moreover, because the act of class certification inevitably spurs some 
analysis of the merits of the case, there is an incentive for both sides to settle as 
quickly as possible, before the case cements itself in the brain of the judge as 
particularly weak or strong, based only on preliminary impressions.81  
 73. See infra Parts IV.B–D. 
 74. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1734 (2008) (discussing the 
benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants under CAFA). 
 75. See infra Part V. 
 76. Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2008) (“Judges and litigants generally view settlement as a win-win outcome.”). 
 77. Id. at 1012–13 (discussing the purported benefits of settlement). 
 78. See, e.g., Mac R. McCoy et al., Nature of the Beast: Recurrent Ethical Issues Confronting Attorneys 
Attempting to Settle Florida Class Actions, 86 FLA. B.J. 36, 36 (2012) (citing InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. 
Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 79. See Hantler et al., supra note 31, at 1138 (“[T]he aggregation of claims increases both the likelihood 
that a defendant will be found liable and the size of any damages award that may result.”). 
 80. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 347–48 (1998) 
(discussing contingent fees in class action suits). 
 81. While courts pay lip service to this not being the case, see Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C10–
03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (“Motions for class certification should not 
become occasions for examining the merits of the case.”); Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW 
(AGRX), 2011 WL 4599833, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (“In determining whether a plaintiff has met his 
burden of demonstrating that each element of Rule 23 has been satisfied, the Court generally does not consider 
the merits of plaintiff's claims.”); Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“In general, 
the court must not consider the merits of the case.”); Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM 
(AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011), it is nonetheless true that merits are discussed. See, 
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Class action settlements, however, even after CAFA, distort the functioning of 
the system. While a usual settlement takes place with no admission of liability and 
no real public stigma, courts view all class action settlements from the starting point 
of a guilty defendant.82 Courts are concerned with the protection of the class 
interest, which presupposes that the class has an interest at all.83 While courts do 
take into account the strength of the case when evaluating the settlement,84 without 
the benefit of full fact-finding, courts are more inclined to give the class the benefit 
of the doubt rather than approve an unfair settlement negotiated solely with 
attorneys’ fees in mind.85 Furthermore, when the settlement takes place prior to 
class certification — which a defendant may desire in order to keep litigation costs 
e.g., Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, LP, 276 F.R.D. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that a class certification would 
have occurred in another case if there had been “some proof” of an alleged policy, and contrasting that with the 
case in front of it, in which plaintiffs “presented significant (indeed, ample) proof that the illegal policy alleged 
in fact exists”); Oscar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 274 F.R.D. 498, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (remarking that plaintiff 
had failed to demonstrate why the product in question was defective, but then noting that it did not need to 
make that merits determination at that time). The courts have acknowledged that a class certification inquiry 
necessarily involves an “overlap” with the merits of the case. Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 
CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 (JCx) 2012 WL 1616912, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); In re Heartland Payment Sys., 
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1051 (S.D. Tex. 2012); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 
F.R.D. 552, 557 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Schramm v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. LA CV09–09442 JAK (FFMx), 
2011 WL 5034663, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 U.S. 1, 
slip op. at 10, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)); Yumul, 2011 WL 1045555, at *4. In fact, at least one court has flatly 
admitted,  
[T]he merits of the class members’ substantive claims are often highly relevant when 
determining whether to certify a class. More importantly, it is not correct to say a district court 
may consider the merits to the extent that they overlap with class certification issues; rather, a 
district court must consider the merits if they overlap with [sic] Rule 23 (a) requirements. 
Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 
970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original). 
 82. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 556 F. Supp. 1117, 1125–26 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 687 
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The proposed settlement is a compromise of disputed claims, but this compromise 
does not imply that Mead or any of the other defendants in this litigation are liable for the claims made by the 
plaintiffs.”); see also Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *22 n.7 (D. Kan. May 
30, 1990) (“In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court has recently recognized that although a consent judgment 
(which is very similar to the type of settlement agreement at issue in this case) is construed largely as a contract, 
it is enforced like an order.”). 
 83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (2006) (stating the representative parties will protect the interests of a 
potential class). 
 84. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011); Hartless v. 
Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Cal. 2011); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 375 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In practice, this examination is necessarily brief and perfunctory, it 
sometimes last no more than a few sentences. See, e.g., Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639–40 (discussing the merits of 
the class action for the purpose of settlement). 
 85. See Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639–40 (discussing a judge’s unwillingness to approve a settlement for fear 
of attorney collusion and because she was concerned that there was significant risk to the plaintiff class in 
accepting settlement). 
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as low as possible — the scrutiny of the settlement is even more severe.86 As well-
intentioned as this system is, it places all parties involved in unusual, less than 
desirable positions. It forces both defendant and plaintiff to frankly expose case 
weaknesses in an effort to win court approval, and forces a court to preside in 
judgment over a case based on limited information. It places defendant in a 
position of arguing in favor of class certification that it would otherwise oppose, 
leading to possible inconsistent stances if the settlement is refused. It rewards a class 
with recovery that it might not otherwise be entitled to, and it casts suspicion and 
doubt on what might be a perfectly respectable settlement.  
For instance, in In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, the appellate 
court expressed concern that an attorneys’ fees award of $800,000 was possibly 
inappropriate when the class’s total recovery was only $100,000.87 However, in a 
non-class-action case, it would not necessarily be unusual for attorneys’ fees to 
stretch into the high six figures and for settlement to be much less if the plaintiffs’ 
case was weak.88 In Bluetooth, among other cases, collusion was suspected merely 
because of the extra scrutiny given to class action settlements.89 Indeed, in Bluetooth, 
the district court had concluded, “[P]laintiffs’ case was not particularly strong in 
light of defendants’ significant defenses.”90 What would otherwise have been an 
unremarkable settlement was twisted into suspicious activity.  
Even more illustrative is the case of Walter v. Hughes Communications, Inc.91 In 
Walter, Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class, claiming violations of California’s 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, negligent 
misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation and omission.92 The 
accusations were based on the allegation that Defendant had misrepresented the 
Internet speeds that its subscribers would receive.93 The parties presented a 
proposed settlement to the court for approval, which the court denied — twice.94 
The first time the court rejected the settlement summarily, noting that it had not 
received vital information it needed to assess the settlement.95 The second time, the 
 86. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946; Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 639 (“Courts require a higher standard of 
fairness when settlement takes place prior to class certification to ensure class counsel and defendant have not 
colluded in settling the case.”); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011). 
 87. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 945. 
 88. See Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement Rule by 
Injecting Certainty Into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 868 (2007) (discussing six figure attorney’s fees 
when settlement amounts are substantially lower). 
 89. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *1. 
 92. Id. at *3. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. at *1. 
 95. See Order Den. Mot. for Settlement at 2–3, Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 WL 2650711 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (No. 09-2136 SC), at *2. 
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court expressed skepticism that a nationwide class could be certified, pointing to 
several defects in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s papers.96 The court went on, however, to 
discuss the fairness and adequacy of the settlement, and admitted point-blank that 
the structure of the settlement was such that it was forced to assume “the role of 
class advocate.”97 In this way, the court drew scathing conclusions about the 
structure of a settlement that was actually fairly standard for this sort of class action: 
an alteration to Defendant’s advertising and treatment of its customers, the offer of 
a minor refund, and a release from all claims against Defendant.98 Indeed, in many 
ways the settlement was more favorable to the class than other settlements.99 
Defendant’s change to its business methods was significant,100 and the refunds 
stretched as high as $40.101 So, for instance, faced with a similar settlement proposal 
— a nominal amount of money for each plaintiff who files a claim and some 
changes to the advertising in question — the court in Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc. 
approved it,102 displaying skepticism for the ability of the class to win at trial.103 The 
court in In re Kentucky Grilled Chicken Coupon Marketing and Sales Practices 
Litigation approved a settlement proposal that, at the most, allowed $15.96 in 
recovery to Plaintiffs.104 In fact, the court in In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. 
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation also allowed a settlement that resulted in 
 96. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *7–10. Indeed, the court’s disdain for plaintiffs’ counsel motion was 
such that the court expressed doubts as to the adequacy of plaintiffs’ counsel:  
Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiffs and putative class members are represented by extremely 
qualified counsel with extensive collective experience prosecuting complex consumer class 
actions cases of this nature.” Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 16. The Court has reviewed the curriculum vitae 
submitted and sees no issue with the qualification and experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel. 
However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s work on this Motion speaks volumes, and the 
Court is not convinced by this work that Plaintiffs’ counsel would adequately represent the class. 
Id. at *9. 
 97. Id. at *12. 
 98. See id. at *4–6. 
 99. Compare id. at *5, with In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040, 1080 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 100. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *1 (discussing the injunctive relief afforded to the plaintiffs). 
 101. Id. at *4. 
 102. Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 568 (S.D. Iowa 2011). 
 103. Id. at 570 (“Based upon the record before the Court, it is clear that the Settlement Class Members 
faced significant risks in adjudicating their claims. The possibility of a large monetary recovery through future 
litigation is highly speculative, and any such recovery would occur only after considerable additional delay. 
Specifically, the Settlement Class Members would have faced challenges by the Defendant regarding their 
eligibility for class certification due to choice of law limitations, diversity complications, and arbitration 
agreements. Additionally, they faced the burden of proving falsity and damages, and the litigation would likely 
have been long and costly, as Defendant has capable counsel at its disposal and intended to challenge nearly 
every aspect of Settlement Class Members’ case. Were the Settlement Class Members to receive a favorable trial 
verdict, they still would have faced costly and lengthy appeals, delaying the receipt of benefits.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
 104. 280 F.R.D. 364, 373 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Indeed, the court called it “excellent results for the Settlement 
Class.” Id. at 371. 
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minimal recovery for Plaintiffs, and which was noteworthy mostly for the fact that 
one member of the class objected that the settlement was unfair to the Defendant 
because most of the class members were not harmed,105 an assertion borne out by 
the extraordinarily low claim rate of eleven total from a class of over 100 million.106 
The Walter court, however, was not pleased with this unremarkable settlement 
proposal. It concluded that the claim process was too difficult, the wording of the 
release too confusing, and that it was unlikely many consumers would bother to 
make claims.107 While the court may indeed have been correct on all of these points, 
the thing to note is that a small amount of claims is only a bad thing if the defendant 
is guilty as charged.108 Try to imagine a defendant settling a case like this by doing 
anything other than whole-heartedly admitting wrongdoing. It becomes impossible. 
The court would not approve any settlement less effective than scorched earth. A 
class action necessarily requires a settlement that gets something for the class, 
regardless of the merits of the underlying action. This is especially striking in this 
particular case, which contains an internal contradiction: the court is skeptical that 
this class action can even be brought — and no doubt under normal circumstances 
the defendant might agree — but at the same time deems the settlement unfair to 
the class — a class it has already admitted it doubts even exists. CAFA’s increased 
detail regarding settlements has not prevented confusing, inconsistent results such 
as this.  
To escape the complications of court approval and to save defendant from 
having to take an unwanted stance on class certification it might not want to take, 
the parties could settle without court approval by foregoing certification of the 
class. Court approval of settlements is only necessary when a class is involved.109 If 
the named parties settle the case without ever certifying a class, there is no need for 
court approval.110 However, doing this would likely defeat the objective of both 
 105. 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1050 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 106. Id. at 1047. While this case was not a deceptive advertising case, it is nonetheless interesting for its 
settlement analysis. 
 107. Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 
2011). The lack of interest in making claims is an ongoing problem in class actions. See, e.g., In re Heartland 
Payment Sys., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (noting that only eleven claims were filed from a class of over one 
hundred million people, “[d]espite a vigorous notice campaign”). 
 108. See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Where there has been a 
pattern of illegal conduct resulting in harm to a large group of people, our system has mechanisms such as class 
action suits for punishing defendants.”).  
 109. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). But see In re Leslie Fay Cos., 168 B.R. 294, 305 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“Compromises may not be made in bankruptcy absent notice and a hearing and a court order.”); In re 
Rothwell, 159 B.R. 374, 379 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (“A settlement agreement [in bankruptcy] is unenforceable 
without notice of the settlement to creditors or a court order approving it.”). 
 110. Although, even pre-certification, it is suggested that counsel must reach a settlement that is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” for the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 2003 (2006) (Subdivision 
(e)). 
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parties in reaching the settlement.111 First, with a settlement, a defendant seeks to get 
rid of a lawsuit while limiting its financial exposure in doing so.112 If the class is not 
certified for purposes of the settlement, then the settlement only settles the claims 
of the named plaintiffs.113 The rest of the class members have not had their interests 
addressed in any way.114 The failure to certify the class for settlement exposes the 
defendant to serial plaintiffs bringing cases against it for the same harm and forces a 
defendant to have to beat class certification not just once but several times, 
increasing overall costs.115  
For instance, in Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., the court refused to certify a class.116 
Defendant settled the suit, now merely an individual one.117 Defendant then found 
itself facing a brand new proposed class action, based on the same allegedly 
deceptive conduct, seeking relief under the same statute.118 Defendant argued the 
new class action was precluded by the Zapka class certification denial.119 The court 
found, however, that “in some circumstances denial of class certification may be 
given estoppel effect,” but not in all circumstances.120 The court noted that the new 
case was attempting to correct the problems of the Zapka case, and found that 
collateral estoppel did not apply.121 Thus, the denial of class certification in Zapka 
exposed Defendant, who settled the case, to more litigation. It may have been in 
Defendant’s best interest not to fight class certification and instead to settle on a 
classwide basis.  
 111. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 28, at 1497–98 (describing the act of settling a class action as “a vehicle 
by which plaintiffs could secure prompt relief at less cost and mass tort defendants could receive a 
comprehensive resolution of a litigation problem that might otherwise consume years, if not decades” and 
adding that “[f]or defendants seeking ‘global peace,’ the settlement class action seemed just the thing”); Staton 
v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant is interested only in disposing of the total 
claim asserted against it.”) (citation omitted). 
 112. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 76, at 1012 (“[S]ettlement brings certainty to an inherently uncertain 
process. All interested parties seek repose: defendants want to minimize their exposure. . . . A settlement 
guarantees that defendants will not face bankrupting liability. . . .”); see also id. at 1012 n.6 (“‘Another potential 
problem is that by aggregating hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of small claims, class counsel can 
threaten defendants with exposure so great that they are reluctant to take the risk of going to trial even if they 
believe they have good defenses; even a small risk of a very large loss may be one the defendant is unwilling to 
take.’” (quoting DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE: FROM NY YANKEES v. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TO BUSH V. 
GORE, 1997–2000 229 (2004))). 
 113. See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1595 (“Where a plaintiff’s stake in the controversy disappears 
before there has been an effort to certify the class action, the action must be dismissed as moot even if it is 
capable of repetition but evading review.”). 
 114. Id. § 1595 n.1 (“A federal court should normally dismiss a putative class action as moot when the 
named plaintiff settles its individual claim and the district court has not certified a class.”). 
 115. See DiFazio, supra note 31, at 138–39 (2012); see also S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 23 (2005). 
 116. No. 99 CV 8238, 2000 WL 1644539, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000). 
 117. See Minute Order of Mar. 20, 2002 at 1, Zapka, 2000 WL 1644539 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000) (No. 1:99-
cv-08238). 
 118. Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 577–78 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 119. Id. at 578–79. 
 120. Id. at 579. 
 121. Id. 
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The lesson, in fact, is clear: battling class certification just forces a defendant to 
keep litigating the question, against plaintiffs who will continue to bring motions or 
suits until they manage to win or the defendant capitulates and settles the whole 
class.122 Indeed, the court in Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC dismissed the 
case because a California case was first-filed but deliberately gave leave to re-file the 
case should the California court deny class certification.123 Effectively, a victory for 
Defendant in the California case will just result in the resumption of the New Jersey 
case and the same fight.124 The case dismissal in New Jersey acts as more of a time-
out than an actual dismissal.125 So established is this try-try again idea, that at least 
one named plaintiff argued immediately for re-briefing after discovery if class 
certification was denied.126 The court, however, rebuffed this bet-hedging.127  
A quintessential illustration of how victory can just bring a defendant more grief 
is found in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.128 For instance, Sears, Roebuck & 
Company found itself subject to a class action lawsuit brought by a named plaintiff, 
Steven Thorogood.129 The court considered the class action suit to be “near-
frivolous.”130 It was based on representations by Sears that its dryer drums were 
 122. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08–4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011); 
Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10–03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (denying 
class certification and simultaneously setting briefing schedule for new class certification motion); Red v. Kraft 
Foods, Inc., No. CV 10–1028–GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (denying class 
certification and simultaneously setting briefing schedule for new class certification motion); Kingsbury v. U.S. 
Greenfiber, LLC, No. CV 08–00151 AHM (JTLx), 2011 WL 2619231, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (regarding 
plaintiffs’ fourth motion for class certification); Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., Inc., No. 09–CV–
748–JMA(NLS), 2011 WL 1935967, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (“A motion for reconsideration may not be 
used to get a second bite at the apple.”); id. at *6 (“It is unclear as to whether Plaintiff, who states ‘it can 
sometimes take plaintiffs two, three, or even four bites at the class-certification apple to propose a class that 
meets Rule 23’s requirements’ intends to re-seek certification as to the previously proposed class or to modify 
his proposed class definition and then seek certification as to a new proposed class.”); Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., 
No. 5:06–cv–06634–JF (PSG), 2011 WL 1496114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011); Order on Pls.’ Mot. for Class 
Certification, In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 413 (D. Me. 2010) [hereinafter 
“Order”] (listing thirteen prior attempts to certify a class of light cigarette smokers). Some commentators have 
noted that the recent Supreme Court decision in Walmart v. Dukes seems to make it harder for plaintiffs to 
certify a class. See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, 47 TRIAL 54, 54 (Nov. 2011); Timothy D. 
Edwards, Class Action Suits after Walmart v. Dukes, 84 WIS. LAW. 18, 18 (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.wisbar.org/. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp. seems to counter that 
by permitting plaintiffs’ attorneys more opportunities to try to get a class certification to stick. See 131 S. Ct. 
2368 (2011). 
 123. See Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017 (ES), 11-3299 (ES), 2012 WL 1079716, at *7 n.5, *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
 124. Id. at *7 n.5. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28, 2012 WL 834125, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 30, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28, 2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 
2012). 
 127. Id. at *3, *9. 
 128. 678 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 129. Id. at 547. 
 130. Id. 
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stainless steel, which the named plaintiff alleged he understood to mean entirely 
stainless steel, when in fact there was a portion of the drum made of ceramic-coated 
regular steel that could only be seen “if [the user] craned his head inside the 
drum.”131 A class was initially certified, but the Seventh Circuit decertified it based 
on a ruling that “there [were] no common issues of law or fact.”132 At first glance, 
this may seem like a win to Sears. Not so: another named plaintiff then brought a 
copycat suit in California.133 Sears moved to enjoin the suit based on the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling in the first suit, and initially won.134 However, the Seventh Circuit, 
based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v. Bayer Corp., later threw up its 
hands and decided that there was nothing it could do to prevent Sears from having 
to defend against a number of such copycat suits based on what appeared to be 
“near-frivolous” allegations.135 As the Seventh Circuit noted, Sears’s strongest 
arguments for why it should be protected from such serial suits were matters of 
policy stemming from this common misuse of the class action procedure; there was 
no jurisdictional doctrine to protect it.136 As the Seventh Circuit saw it, “the policy 
concerns are acute.”137 But the Seventh Circuit found it had no choice but to permit 
the copycat suit to go forward.138 In this case, Sears would have been better off not 
fighting class certification and either dealing with the merits of the “near-frivolous” 
case or just settling to try to get out of the labyrinth.  
In addition to the cycle of duplicative cases facing a defendant who does not 
settle a class action, it is an ethical violation for plaintiffs’ attorneys to agree, as part 
of a settlement, not to pursue further claims against the defendant.139 This means 
that failure to certify the class in settlement would result in the possibility of not 
just multiple cases involving the same class of plaintiffs but multiple cases involving 
the same plaintiffs’ attorneys.140 Nor is there any guarantee that a motion to dismiss 
or motion for summary judgment will stand up due to the complicated preclusive 
issues of different causes of action in different states.141  
 131. Id. at 548–49. 
 132. Id. at 549 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 547 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 133. Id. at 547. 
 134. Id. at 548. 
 135. Id. at 547–48 (citing Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011)); id. at 552. 
 136. Id. at 552. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See McCoy et al., supra note 78, at 40. 
 140. Thorogood, 678 F.3d at 547 (“Not only was it a copycat suit, but Murray had been a member of 
Thorogood's proposed (and certified, but later decertified) class, and was represented in his own suit by counsel 
who had represented Thorogood in the latter's class action suit.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 976–77 (1998). 
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Meanwhile, it is in the plaintiffs’ best interest to get the class certified, too.142 The 
very nature of deceptive advertising causes of action ensures that it is unlikely all 
class members will independently sue.143 The settlement of the whole class is the best 
way for most consumers to ever achieve any redress.144 Even plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have an incentive to get the class certified and the settlement approved.145 While 
serial cases may sound nice in the abstract, one fell swoop of money surely sounds 
even nicer. Therefore, even with the challenges of settling a certified class, there 
remains unusually strong incentive on both sides to settle — and to settle early, 
because costs rise quickly in class actions. 
In fact, in order to even reach a wildly unpredictable and dubiously helpful class 
certification decision, all parties must engage in lengthy, expensive discovery.146 The 
named plaintiffs often must sit for depositions.147 Class members beyond the named 
plaintiffs may be deposed, too,148 which requires the identification and location of 
 142. See, e.g., Heather M. Johnson, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation Within the Federal Rules: 
A Case for the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2333 (1996) (“Rule 23 
allows plaintiffs to combine resources and litigate claims or issues together, thereby providing access to the civil 
justice system for plaintiffs who lack financial resources to bring individual claims.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of 
Attorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 490 (2008) (reasoning that in 
cases of consumer fraud, “a consumer is unlikely to bring an individual lawsuit on the basis of the common law 
action for fraud to recover her losses because the legal fees and costs for the lawsuit far outweigh the amount the 
consumer could recover from the lawsuit”). 
 144. See id.; see also Leslie, supra note 76, at 1012–13. 
 145. See Leslie, supra note 76, at 1010, 1012–13. 
 146. See § 1785.3 Timing of Certification, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785.3 (3d ed. 2005) ("[C]ourts 
frequently have ruled that discovery relating to the issue whether a class action is appropriate needs to be 
undertaken before deciding whether to allow the action to proceed on a class basis."). 
 147. See, e.g., Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 
1616912, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012), reconsideration granted, Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 
CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 2458118 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2012) (referencing deposition of 
named plaintiff); In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–
DRH–PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *16 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (reviewing the deposition of Ms. Burns, a named 
plaintiff); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08–4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011) 
(discussing the named plaintiff’s deposition testimony as it relates to the Defendants’ case); Badella v. Deniro 
Mktg. LLC, No. C 10–03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (detailing the 
circumstances of one named plaintiff’s depature following his deposition); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 
560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (referring to a named plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding Nutella); Red v. Kraft 
Foods, Inc., No. CV 10–1028–GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (recalling exact 
language from two named plaintiffs’ testimony about “indulgent treats”); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 
10–01192 JSW, 2011 WL 2221113, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (using a named plaintiff’s deposition 
testimony to determine the plaintiff’s standing); see also Heisler v. Maxtor Corp., No. 5:06–cv–06634–JF (PSG), 
2011 WL 1496114, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011); Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 691–92 
(S.D. Fla 2010), vacated, Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2011); Nelson v. Mead 
Johnson Nutrition Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2010); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 
271 F.R.D. 402, 411 (D. Me. 2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 
3119452, at *2 n.3, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. and Sales Practices 
Litig., Nos. 05 C 4742, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007). 
 148. See, e.g., In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. at 416; Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, 
at *3. 
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these class members — an enormous expense in a day and age when the amount of 
retained information has exploded.149 Witnesses for the defendant are often deposed 
as well.150 The parties frequently engage experts, another sizeable expense.151 Indeed, 
in at least one case the court criticized one defendant’s expert for not having 
undertaken a survey, implying that not only the use of an expert but the costly 
exercise of a full-blown consumer survey may now be de rigeur at the class 
certification stage.152 
Because attorneys’ fees are approved based in part on percentage of settlement 
amount, the defendant has a better chance of keeping the overall settlement low if it 
can settle before attorneys’ fees rack up.153 Otherwise, the defendant may be forced 
to increase the settlement amount just to justify the increased attorneys’ fees.154 
Therefore, even with CAFA’s additional guidance, settlement remains tricky to 
navigate in the class action context. 
 149. See, e.g., In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 387 (N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
 150. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1081 n.13 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken, 280 
F.R.D. at 372; Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *8. 
 151. See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 678 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2012) (relying on the 
plaintiff’s engineering expertise); Heisler, 2011 WL 1496114, at *3 (filing expert disclosures); Red, 2011 WL 
4599833, at *12 (offering the testimony of a Columbia Business School professor); Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 
272 F.R.D. 477, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using expert testimony to demonstrate the plausibility of their claim); 
Zeisel, 2011 WL 2221113, at *2 (submitting an expert report from a medical doctor); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011) (using expert testimony of a doctor); Salon 
Fad v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5063(DLC), 2011 WL 4089902, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) 
(supporting their claim with an expert report of an economics professor); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage 
Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 377 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (offering expert testimony as to the materiality of Blue Sky’s product 
labeling and marketing); Fitzpatrick, 263 F.R.D. at 697 (submitting an expert report that explains the brand 
benefit garnered when a product helps digestive issues); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 
F.R.D. at 408 (introducing expert testimony demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge of the harm of 
cigarettes); Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *4, *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (offering expert testimony on the 
certification of plaintiff’s class). 
 152. See Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *8 (criticizing Defendant’s expert for not citing any specific studies 
or specific market research that would make his reports more reliable). Earlier court decisions appear to have 
permitted less costly declarations in lieu of full-blown expert reports. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 
1081 n.15 (using a mere statement of a doctor as support for an argument). However, that precedent may now 
be passé. See Jenkins v. Hyundai Motor Fin. Co., No. C2-04-720, 2008 WL 781862, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 
2008) (refusing to characterize expert testimony as such if it only expresses legal conclusions and not facts). 
 153. See In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (awarding 
attorneys’ fees based on the lodestar method because a settlement was reached); In re Heartland Payment Sys., 
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1074–75 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (discussing how 
attorneys’ fees are tied to the value of the benefits actually provided to the class, which is largely based on the 
amount of hours actually worked); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 645 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (finding 
attorneys’ fees reasonable based on achieving a favorable result and the expertise required to successfully try the 
case); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken, 280 F.R.D. at 379–80 (reimbursing attorneys from the settlement fund). CAFA 
also explicitly links attorneys’ fees in coupon settlements to the value of the coupons redeemed. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1712 (2006) (“[T]he portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of 
the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”). 
 154. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 945 (finding an issue with the attorneys receiving 83.2% of the class’ 
total award and ultimately rejecting the proposed settlement by remanding it back to the District Court). 
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B. Inconsistent Precedent 
A wealth of inconsistent precedent, not entirely attributable to warring state statutes 
but certainly not helped by them,155 ensures that it is impossible to establish 
uniform guidance for national advertising campaigns — or the class action 
litigations that result. A brief comparison of different cases’ treatment of reliance on 
the allegedly deceptive statements illustrates this. 
In Fine v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of consumers 
who had purchased popcorn marked “no added diacetyl,” yet still containing some 
diacetyl.156 Under California law, the court denied certification, stating that there 
was no indication that the class had relied on the statement in question.157 Chavez v. 
Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., likewise brought under California statutes, also 
concerned an allegedly untrue statement on a product: this time, the statement that 
the product originated from Santa Fe when the beverages in question were not 
made in Santa Fe.158 In this case, however, the court granted certification.159 While 
the Defendant raised the issue that had prevented class certification in Fine — 
namely, that it was impossible to know if each consumer in the class had relied on 
the statement in question in purchasing the product — the court dismissed the 
concern as irrelevant.160 Indeed, the court in Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc. seemed to 
agree with Chavez, certifying a class for settlement purposes under California and 
Iowa law while acknowledging that “some significant number of purchasers” 
bought the product “without regard to” the alleged deceptive statements.161 In Red 
v. Kraft Foods, Inc., however, also under California law, the court refused to certify a 
class that, inter alia, it found to be unascertainable, even though the class definition 
was remarkably similar to that of classes that had been certified in other deceptive 
advertising cases,162 because it would be impossible to determine which consumers 
 155. See Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (detailing differences 
between state laws). 
 156. No. CV 10-01848 SJO (CFOx), 2010 WL 3632469, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). 
 157. Id. at *3. 
 158. 268 F.R.D. 365, 368–69 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (contending that Blue Sky’s beverages were not 
manufactured or bottled in Sante Fe or anywhere in the state of New Mexico). 
 159. Id. at 368. 
 160. Id. at 376 (holding that plaintiff does not need to show individualized reliance in order to allege claims 
of CLRA or fraud). 
 161. Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 570 n.7 (S.D. Iowa 2011). 
 162. See Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 555 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying a class of all persons who 
purchased Men’s Vitamins in the state of California from the date that they were first sold with “prostate 
health” claims); In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (certifying a class of all persons who, 
on or after August 1, 2009, bought a Nutella product in the state of California for their own or household use); 
Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) 
(refusing to certify the class because its members were unascertainable); Kelly, 277 F.R.D. at 567–69 (granting 
certification of a class of all persons who purchased one or more of Phiten products in the U.S. during the 
relevant period); Chavez, 268 F.R.D. at 380 (certifying a class of all persons who, during the relevant period, 
purchased in the U.S. any beverage bearing the Blue Sky mark or brand); Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition 
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had purchased the product at issue in reliance on the allegedly deceptive 
statements.163 This is not even a result of different state statutory requirements: all of 
these cases were applying California law.  
Likewise, courts have reached wildly different conclusions about the importance 
of whether consumers continued to buy the product at issue, even after the alleged 
deception was revealed. In Nelson v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., the named 
plaintiff testified at deposition that she continued using the product at issue, even 
after learning the truth about the product.164 In In re Light Cigarettes Marketing Sales 
Practices Litigation the named plaintiff testified at deposition that he continued 
using the product at issue, even after learning the truth about the product.165 The 
court in Nelson granted class certification under Florida law;166 the court in Light 
Cigarettes denied it under California, District of Columbia, Illinois, and Maine 
law.167 There were undeniable differences between the two cases, and neither 
decision pivoted exclusively on whether or not the named plaintiff had continued 
to use the allegedly deceiving product.168 However, both courts pointed to that fact 
as supporting completely opposite conclusions.169 Faced with seemingly inconsistent 
plaintiff testimony, a defendant may not know whether that testimony will be 
helpful or not to the defense. Indeed, the court in In re Ferrero Litigation viewed the 
knowledge that one of the named plaintiffs continued to purchase the product — 
even after learning the truth about it — as having no bearing on the class 
certification analysis.170 Increasing the confusion, other courts have stated that 
Co., 270 F.R.D. 689, 691 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (certifying a class of all Florida consumers who purchased Enfamil 
LIPIL within the applicable statute of limitations). 
 163. See Red, 2011 WL 4599833, at *8; see also Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (denying class certification because class membership would require consumers “to show they were 
misled, deceived, tricked, or treated unfairly,” although reliance was not required under the Illinois Consumer 
Fraud Act). 
 164. Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695. 
 165. See In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 412 (D. Me. 2010) (noting that 
plaintiffs continued to purchase cigarettes after learning of the alleged fraud). 
 166. Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 698. 
 167. In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. at 423. 
 168. See id. at 416–17, 422 (holding that issues of predominance and superiority prevented class 
certification); Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695 (continuing to discuss other class certification factors in spite of 
evidence showing that plaintiff continued to use the defendant’s product after learning it was defective). 
 169. See Nelson, 270 F.R.D. at 695–96 (finding it unpersuasive that the plaintiff continued to purchase the 
defendant’s product, even after learning of its alleged defects); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 
271 F.R.D. at 421 (finding the issue of continuing to purchase the alleged defective product to weigh against 
issues of commonality, but enough to alone bar class certification); see also Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-
1028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding the issue of continuing to 
purchase the alleged defective item to destroy plaintiff’s ability to establish reliance or materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentations). 
 170. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that plaintiff’s continued 
purchases of the defendant’s product after learning of the alleged defect did not impact issues of class 
commonality). But see Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 
WL 1616912, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (finding it noteworthy that all of the named plaintiffs had testified 
that they would not have bought the product without the allegedly misleading statements). 
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whether or not the plaintiff continued to purchase the product after learning the 
truth about the product has nothing to do with class certification, but rather with 
the strength of the case, and is inappropriate to examine at the class certification 
stage.171 
Finally, some of the language in the cases is so broad as to appear to preclude 
class actions for deceptive advertising under any circumstances. In Salon Fad v. 
L’Oreal USA, Inc., the deceptive advertising at issue was variations of the phrase 
“Sold in Salons Only” found on hair care product bottles.172 The court remarked:  
[I]t is difficult to imagine how there could be class-wide proof of causation 
and injury. How salon customers would react to learning that a product 
which was advertised as exclusively sold in salons was also available in 
another retail environment is inherently an individualized question. To 
some consumers, it may be of little significance that the product is also 
available outside of the salon, unless of course it could be acquired more 
cheaply in a general retail establishment.173 
The same could be said of any piece of allegedly deceptive advertising: some 
consumers might not care at all about it. For example, surely some consumers 
buying the beverage at issue in Chavez did not care if the beverage was 
manufactured in New Mexico or not.174  
Frankly, regardless of the differences between state statutes, it appears to be the 
case that courts are inevitably influenced by their opinion of the underlying merits 
of the case in their decisions whether to certify a class, which makes practical class 
certification precedent hard to come by. Where a court is skeptical about the 
underlying merits, that court finds issues in facts and details that another court, 
persuaded by the underlying merits, finds to be irrelevant.175 For instance, the court 
in Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., commenced its analysis of the Plaintiffs’ class 
certification motion with a harsh critique of Plaintiffs’ tactics in bringing the 
motion.176 The court then went on to raise scathing issues with the class Plaintiffs 
sought to certify.177 For instance, the court made much of the fact that, as defined, 
not every member of the class would necessarily have complaints about the 
 171. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 575, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding that plaintiff’s 
continued purchases of the defendant’s product after learning of the alleged defect is an aspect of case’s merits 
and is not decided during class certification analysis). 
 172. Salon Fad v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5063(DLC), 2011 WL 4089902, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 
2011). 
 173. Id. at *7. 
 174. Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 175. See infra notes 176–84 and accompanying text. 
 176. No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 2012 WL 834125, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan 30, 2012) (recommending that 
plaintiff’s motion for class certification be denied because it was filed in an untimely manner). 
 177. Id. at *3–4. 
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product.178 However, other courts have been unconcerned with the prospect that 
class members might not have complaints about the product (and, indeed, might 
still be purchasing the product).179 The Walewski court also fretted over the inability 
to identify all members of the class.180 Meanwhile, other courts faced with a similar 
issue were unconcerned.181 For instance, the court in Johns v. Bayer Corp., faced with 
the challenge of certifying a class of purchasers of multivitamins, never even 
discussed the difficulties of identifying who these purchasers might be.182 Needless 
to say, the court did not certify the class in Walewski.183 While such influence by the 
merits of the underlying case is not technically permitted,184 it nonetheless seems to 
occur. 
C. Statewide Classes 
The inability to certify a nationwide class to address issues of national significance 
can have far-reaching consequences, subjecting the courts to duplicative litigations 
and the parties to multiple copycat disagreements, as CAFA recognizes.185 This 
certification failure not only makes final court resolution of the issues nonexistent, 
but it also stalls settlements, as a defendant may only wish to settle a class action if 
that defendant can settle the entire nationwide issue.186 However, certifying a 
nationwide class for the state law governed field of deceptive advertising is tricky:  
Where the applicable law in a case derives from the law of numerous states, 
as opposed to just one state, differences in state law will compound the 
disparities among class members from different states. . . . Certifying a class 
 178. Id. at *4–5 (finding issues with plaintiff’s class definition because it would include members who did 
not have any complaints about defendant’s game). 
 179. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing the issue of whether or not 
potential class members had concerns with defendant’s product). 
 180. See Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s class definition “fraught with difficulties” 
because of the issues in identifying the class members); see also In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 
271 F.R.D. 402, 422 (D. Me. 2010) (noting the concern in finding all purchasers of defendant’s cigarettes); 
Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010). 
 181. See In re Ferrero, 278 F.R.D. at 562 (certifying a class of purchasers of Nutella®); Chavez v. Blue Sky 
Natural Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that a class of all purchasers of an 
inexpensive beverage would be identifiable). 
 182. 280 F.R.D. 551, 556 (S.D. Cal. 2012). But see Thompson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:07CV00017 JMM, 2009 
WL 2424352, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 6, 2009) (expressing doubt that a class of purchasers of multivitamins could 
ever be ascertainable). 
 183. Walewski, 2012 WL 834125, at *1. 
 184. See Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A court may not refuse 
to certify a class on the ground that it thinks the class will eventually lose on the merits . . . .”). 
 185. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 27 (2005) (“These provisions will create efficiencies in the judicial 
system by enabling overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases to be consolidated in a single federal court, rather than 
proceeding simultaneously in numerous state courts under the current system.”). 
 186. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] defendant is interested only in 
disposing of the total claim asserted against it.”). 
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when the laws of every state apply can create insuperable obstacles in 
adjudicating the case in a fair and efficient manner.187  
While resolving all the alleged injury in one fell swoop is clearly most efficient for 
all involved, the state law nature of deceptive advertising thwarts that efficiency: 
“Variations in state law can swamp any common issues and interject a multitude of 
different legal standards governing a particular claim. The presentation of evidence 
at trial, jury instructions, and verdict forms become cumbersome, time-consuming, 
confusing, and unduly prejudicial to the parties.”188 
For instance, in a case involving allegedly deceptive statements on the boxes of 
several different products sold nationwide, a California federal court declined to 
certify a national class.189 The court, however, stated that, if there had not been other 
problems with the case, it might have certified a smaller California-only case — 
even though, again, the allegedly deceptive statements at issue were part of a 
nationwide campaign.190 Similarly, despite the nationwide character of the allegedly 
deceptive statements at issue, a California court refused to certify a nationwide class 
while agreeing to certify a California-only class.191 As one court stated:  
If this case proceeded to trial as a nationwide class, the Court would face the 
impossible task of instructing the jury on the law of 50 different states. . . . 
The trial would devolve quickly into an unmanageable morass of divergent 
legal issues. Certain evidence would be admissible for some class members 
but not others. Fifty different sets of jury instructions and verdict forms 
would have to be crafted with the jury having the daunting task of applying 
those instructions and verdicts to a nationwide class encompassing millions 
of consumers. Needless to say, the trial would be incredibly time-
consuming, unnecessarily disjointed, hopelessly confusing, and unfairly 
prejudicial to [Defendant] and many, if not all, of the members of the class. 
 187. Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW (AGRx), 2011 WL 4599833, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
29, 2011) (denying class certification for, inter alia, concerns that defendant’s misrepresentations actually 
originated in California). 
 190. Id. (noting that there were several other issues with the class that precluded certification). 
 191. See In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 561 (S.D. Cal. 2011); see also Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-
4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011). But see Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 549 
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding defendant did not carry its burden of proving material conflict between California’s 
consumer protection laws and the rest of the nation’s consumer protection laws). 
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Justice demands that this case not be adjudicated as a nationwide class 
action.192 
Multiple lawsuits over the same deceptive statements often inevitably crop up in 
this situation.193 In fact, so prevalent are multiple litigations in the class action 
context that some courts have refused to certify a class without the presence of 
duplicative litigation.194 Many times, these multiple lawsuits actually proceed.195 
Indeed, if a court does dismiss duplicative litigation, it must minimize differences in 
the state statutes to do so.196 These court actions do not promote judicial efficiency 
in any way.197 Courts often find themselves litigating cases that other courts are 
simultaneously litigating, with the risk of inconsistent results.198 For instance, a New 
Jersey court refused to allow the Plaintiff of a first-filed California suit based on the 
same allegedly deceptive advertisements to intervene, stating there was no risk of 
inconsistent rulings because different statutes were at issue.199 However, a few 
 192. Gianino, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (internal citations omitted); see also In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools 
Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 05 C 4742, 05 C 2623, 2007 WL 4287511, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007) 
(“[P]laintiff’s essentially conclusory assertions that the . . . consumer fraud laws are ‘very similar’ are wholly 
unpersuasive. The differences in the . . . consumer fraud laws of the states are another factor that renders the 
proposed class action unmanageable.”). 
 193. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 394 (“[T]he filing of a single class action in a state court often leads to 
a number of ‘copycat’ cases being filed in other jurisdictions.”) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1248–49 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Frist)); see also In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 
2011) (noting that twenty-six class actions had been filed); Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the case had originally been filed in federal court in New York, then consolidated with a previously 
filed related case in federal court in Utah, then dismissed and brought again in state court in New Jersey); 
Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11-1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11-5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 1616912, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (cases filed in the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York 
within a day of each other); Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES), 11-3017(ES), 11-
3299(ES), 2012 WL 1079716, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (dismissed in favor of first-filed California case); In re 
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 2012); 
Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 636 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (with its related cases: Case No. 37-2009-93810-
CU-BT-CTL in San Diego Superior Court and Case No. 09cv138 in S.D. Cal.); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, 
Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon Mktg. 
& Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 371, 371 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 194. See Badella v. Deniro Mktg. LLC, No. C 10-03908 CRB, 2011 WL 5358400, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 
2011) (noting that the absence of other litigation concerning the same issue weighed against class certification). 
 195. See Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 5, 2010) (proceeding simultaneously with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another state). 
 196. See Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *6 (finding substantial overlap between cases filed against the 
defendant, even when they were filed under different state statutes). 
 197. Indeed, it goes against one of the purposes of class actions. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, §§ 1:1, 
1:3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 1966 Amendment Clause (A) (“Actions by or against a class provide a ready and fair 
means of achieving unitary adjudication.”). 
 198. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 32, § 1:1 (“Finally, the class action avoids inconsistent results by offering 
the efficiency and predictability of a unitary adjudication or settlement of the claims of all persons to whom the 
defendant may be liable based on similar facts.”); Weiner, 2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (proceeding simultaneously 
with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another state). 
 199. Worthington v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, Nos. 11-2793 (ES)(CLW), 11-3017 (ES)(CLW), 11-3299 
(ES)(CLW), 2011 WL 6303999, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2011); see also Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 
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months later, the court acknowledged that these different statutes were, in fact, 
similar enough that the second-filed case should be dismissed.200  
The dissent in Mazza v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.201 recognizes the 
practical disaster this jurisdictional splintering creates:  
The majority’s holding will prove devastating to consumers. Individual 
claimants will not bring actions to recover the $4,000 paid for the CMBS 
systems. Even if consumers did pursue these claims, and even if these claims 
proved successful, they “would not only unnecessarily burden the judiciary, 
but would prove uneconomic for potential plaintiffs’ because ‘litigation costs 
would dwarf potential recovery.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 
1023 (9th Cir. 1998). Without certification of a nationwide class to which 
California law applies, Honda becomes free to avail itself of the benefits 
offered by California without having to answer to allegations by consumers 
nationwide that it has violated the consumer protection laws of its forum 
state. This situation will allow corporations to take advantage of a forum 
state’s hospitable business climate on the one hand, while simultaneously 
discounting the potential for litigation by nationwide consumers in response 
to a particular profit-motivated but harmful action on the other. If the 
harm to individual consumers is small enough to create a disincentive to 
individual litigation, and if a nationwide class action is not a potential 
consequence, corporations can choose increased revenues over the consumer 
with impunity. Thus, corporations like Honda will be able to act without 
accountability for past behavior and without a check on future profit-
motivated actions that may risk consumer harm.202  
Moreover, the tangle of precedent for a deceptive advertising class action has 
become so convoluted that at least one court found it necessary to resort to giving a 
lesson on persuasive versus binding authority.203 This confusing federalist tangle 
stands in contrast to the goal of CAFA to try to eliminate such complication and 
draw a halt to the abuses of federalism in states applying other states’ laws (or not 
581, 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2012) (decertifying a nationwide class because of differences in consumer protection 
laws); In re Ferrero Litig., No. 11-CV-00205-H (CAB), 2012 WL 284265, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012); Weiner, 
2010 WL 3119452, at *3 (proceeding simultaneously with “a nearly identical action” in federal court in another 
state). 
 200. Worthington, 2012 WL 1079716, at *6. 
 201. 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 202. Id. at 598–99 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 203. See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-
PMF, 2012 WL 865041 at *8 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (warning that persuasive authority should not be 
presented as controlling authority); see also Walewski v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 
2012 WL 834125 at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 6:11-cv-1178-Orl-28DAB, 
2012 WL 847236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2012) (construing the Maryland Consumer Protection Act by a Florida 
court). 
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applying other states’ laws).204 The situation becomes unwinnable: Certifying only a 
state class provokes precedential confusion and inefficiency; certifying a nationwide 
class forces a court to insult federalism.  
D. The Frailty of CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions 
CAFA’s expanded federal jurisdiction was supposed to keep cases of national 
importance out of state courts.205 However, the expanded provisions have limited 
utility when it comes to deceptive advertising class actions.206 Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
can simply certify that recovery will be limited to below the triggering jurisdictional 
amount of CAFA.207 This is an easy assertion to make in a situation where only a 
statewide class is at issue, despite the nationwide character of the harm.208 In this 
way, plaintiffs’ attorneys certify to limit recovery of a group of plaintiffs who, at this 
point, do not even know they are part of a class.209 In doing so, the plaintiffs’ 
 204. See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 593 (“The importance of federalism when applying choice of law principles to 
class action certification is reinforced by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4. A key 
purpose of the Act was to correct what former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger labeled a wave of ‘false 
federalism.’ ‘[T]he problem is that many state courts faced with interstate class actions have undertaken to 
dictate the substantive laws of other states by applying their own laws to other states, resulting in a breach of 
federalism principles.’ S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 61 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 57 (quotation marks 
and ellipses omitted). Accordingly, ‘courts should not attempt to apply the laws of one state to behaviors that 
occurred in other jurisdictions.’ Id. at 62–63 (summarizing Supreme Court cases).”). 
 205. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 388 (quoting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 
§ 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (“The Act also aims to ‘restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution 
by providing the Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.”)); Milliken, supra note 
1, at 19. 
 206. See Sheila Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to 
Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 33–34 (2006) (“As others have noted, the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) is not going to solve the documented abuses of the consumer class 
action.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 666 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 2012) (“To counter any 
attempt at removal, however, Rolwing's complaint included a prayer for relief requesting ‘judgment against 
defendant in an amount that is fair and reasonable in excess of $25,000, but not to exceed $4,999,999.’ The 
prayer stated further: ‘Plaintiff and the class do not seek—and will not accept—any recovery of damages (in the 
form of statutory interest) and any other relief, in total, in excess of $4,999,999.’”); Tate v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 
No. 06-1204-HU, 2007 WL 1170608 at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 17, 2007) (“[A] plaintiff may evade federal court simply 
by asking for less than the jurisdictional amount, so long as the plaintiff, should she prevail, isn't legally certain 
to recover more.”) (citation omitted). 
 208. See, e.g., Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008 at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. July 11, 2005) (“In the complaint plaintiff alleges that she seeks, on her own behalf and on behalf of the 
proposed statewide class, an amount in controversy below CAFA's $5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that ‘[a]ggregate damages for the named plaintiff and the class she seeks to act as a 
representative total less than $5,000,000.’ Compl. ¶ 61.”) (emphasis added). 
 209. See Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit: Class Members Deserve Notice, Even in No-Money Deals, THOMAS 
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT: NEW YORK, Aug. 25, 2012, available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com 
/Legal/News/2012/08_-_August/2nd_Circuit__Class_members_deserve_notice,_even_in_no-money_deals/ 
(discussing how some class members are not even given notice of the nationwide claims of which they are 
members). 
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attorneys fight against the interest of the class from the very beginning.210 An 
unknowledgeable named plaintiff has been considered a due process violation of 
the absent class members.211 Why shouldn’t a limitation of the absent class 
members’ rights be equally considered such a violation? It is certainly more 
obviously harmful than an unknowledgeable named plaintiff. In Sanchez v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., the court expressed concern that Plaintiff had chosen not to bring 
any personal injury claims, engaging in “strategic claim-splitting.”212 The court 
found that this “create[d] a conflict between plaintiff’s interests and those of the 
putative class, and render[ed] Plaintiff an inadequate class representative.”213 Why 
doesn’t the express limitation of recovery of the absent plaintiffs raise the same 
concern as limiting their claims?  
Courts, however, seem to disagree. For instance, in Morgan v. Gay, a class of 
New Jersey consumers asserted that it would not recover more than the $5 million 
necessary to trigger federal jurisdiction.214 Morgan concerned a case that had 
previously been in no fewer than two federal courts, before being dismissed by class 
counsel and re-brought in state court.215 Despite its prior federal jurisdiction and 
the fact that the class was seeking punitive damages which could have exceeded $5 
million, the court held that class counsel’s promise not to seek more than $5 million 
kept the case in state court.216 The vast majority of class members had no say in this 
refusal of punitive damages.217 The court dismissed these concerns:  
We note in passing that the defendants’ assertion that Sarah Morgan does 
not have the ability to limit damages of unnamed class members has no 
merit. The availability of opting out by unnamed class members assuages 
any concerns that Sarah Morgan’s damage limitation harms these other 
class members. The potential class members in this case will be notified 
pursuant to New Jersey Court Rules 4:32-1(b)(3) and 4:32-2(b)(2). 
Under N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-2(b)(2)(E), “the court will exclude from the class 
 210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to act in the best interest of the class, not 
merely named clients). 
 211. See Sanchez v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. 2:06-CV-02573-JAM-KJM, 2009 WL 1514435, at *3 
(E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009) (“Class counsel may not act ‘on behalf of an essentially unknowledgeable client,’ for to 
proceed with that plaintiff as class representative ‘would risk a denial of due process to the absent class 
members.’”). 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. 471 F.3d 469, 475 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 215. Id. at 471. 
 216. Id. at 470–71. 
 217. Id. at 477–78 (“The plaintiff has made her choice, and the plaintiffs in state court who choose not to 
opt out of the class must live with it.”). 
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any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may 
elect to be excluded.”218  
In so doing, the court thereby implicitly endorses that the solution to a potentially 
artificial limitation on recovery on an admittedly nationwide advertising campaign 
will be to subject the defendant to multiple duplicative lawsuits on the question, 
even possibly within the same state.219 The court does acknowledge that a verdict far 
in excess of the jurisdictional limit may expose class counsel to accusations of bad 
faith.220 However, that presupposes that the case will survive to the verdict stage 
rather than simply settling. 
Likewise, the court in Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp. reaches the 
same conclusion.221 There, the Plaintiff class sought mainly injunctive relief and no 
monetary damages.222 The class had also specifically stated that it would not seek 
more than $5 million in statutory damages.223 The court therefore concluded that it 
would be difficult for Plaintiffs to recover more than $5 million in light of these 
circumstances, finding that the jurisdictional minimum was not met.224 This ruling, 
however, ignores the practicality of class members not yet even aware of the class 
who might disagree with being bound to restrict their recovery and might therefore 
either object or launch different suits, in California or other states, creating a drag 
on judicial efficiency and forcing the defendants to litigate the same question 
multiple times. Furthermore, the Defendant in the case tried to demonstrate that 
any injunctive relief awarded would cost it more than $5 million to comply with, 
which seems likely given the nationwide scope of the practice at issue.225 However, 
the court disagreed, finding the Defendant’s valuation of this harm speculative at 
best.226 If Defendants are unable to assert the true nationwide impact of any 
injunction that may issue in assessing the jurisdictional amount, then the true 
national importance of the case cannot be asserted.227  
 218. Id. at 476 n.7.  
 219. See also Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that 
federal jurisdiction could have been avoided if the class had promised not to accept damages in excess of the 
jurisdictional minimum).  
 220. Morgan, 471 F.3d at 477 n.8. 
 221. Berry v. Am. Express Publ’g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123–26 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove that the amount in controversy exceeded the $5 million minimum). 
 222. Id. at 1123–24. 
 223. Id. at 1124. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376–77 (2008) (emphasizing the broader 
impact of an injunction as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right . . . In exercising their sound 
discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the 
extraordinary remedy of injunction”) (citations omitted). 
A Matter of National Importance 
150 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Another court in the same jurisdiction went in the opposite direction, 
however.228 There, the complaint stated that the class was seeking less than the $5 
million jurisdictional minimum.229 The court found this “a clear attempt to avoid 
federal jurisdiction.”230 The Plaintiff attempted to argue that she was “entitled to 
limit her claim for relief and avoid federal jurisdiction.”231 The court disagreed, 
however, finding that the very purpose of CAFA was to eliminate “misuse” of this 
nature.232 Such battles remain ongoing.233 
V. Fixing the Broken System 
CAFA was meant to react to the perception that cases of national significance were 
getting stuck in state court.234 However, the nature of deceptive advertising actions 
limits CAFA’s impact. It remains a simple matter to keep cases involving 
nationwide harm as creatures of state law.235 This curious situation, as has been 
shown, promotes efficiency for neither plaintiffs, defendants, nor the courts. The 
class action, supposedly a win-win-win for all involved, is far from being so in the 
deceptive advertising realm. 
Deceptive advertising has become a classic cause of action to be vindicated by 
class action procedure.236 The harm to each individual buyer of an inexpensive low-
risk item, such as yogurt, is so small as to be negligible.237 In this age of expensive, 
drawn-out litigations, no plaintiff is willing to bring a cause of action to recover the 
 228. See Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM (RCX), 2005 WL 2083008 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
July 11, 2005) (ruling that, in cases where the court is unsure if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 
Congress intended CAFA to give jurisdiction to the federal courts). 
 229. Id. at *2. 
 230. Id. at *1. 
 231. Id. at *2. 
 232. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 11 (2005)). 
 233. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 116 (“One question that the courts have not yet clearly answered is 
whether or not plaintiffs could limit the amount in controversy by stipulating that they would not accept any 
more than five million dollars in total recovery for the class.”). 
 234. S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 27 (2005) (“[F]ederal courts are the appropriate forum to decide most 
interstate class actions because these cases usually involve large amounts of money and many plaintiffs, and 
have significant implications for interstate commerce and national policy . . . .”). 
 235. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes may encourage 
more state class actions, exacerbating this problem. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 U.S. 1, slip op. 
at 10, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see Apalla U. Chopra & David Lowe, Class Action Litigation and Arbitration After 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T v. Concepcion, 870 PLI/LIT 175, 194 (Nov. 2011). 
 236. See Guido v. L’Oreal, USA, Inc., Nos. CV 11–1067 CAS (JCx), CV 11–5465 CAS (JCx), 2012 WL 
1616912, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (finding that class action litigation is superior to other methods of 
litigation for deceptive advertising cases); Ballard v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 600 (E.D. Cal. 
1999) (“[Class actions] to enforce compliance with consumer protection laws are ‘desirable and should be 
encouraged.’” (quoting Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Ariz. 1982))); see also 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (stating that consumers can bring a class action lawsuit if an “unlawful method, act, or 
practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated”). 
 237. See Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 702 (S.D. Fla. 2010), vacated, 635 F.3d 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“[E]ach class member has a negligible financial interest in the litigation.”). 
Stacey M. Lantagne 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 151
eighty-nine cents they spent on yogurt. Indeed, “incentive payouts” of several 
thousand dollars are common to reward plaintiffs who allow themselves to be 
named in such class actions, under the accepted belief that otherwise they would 
not bother to bring the cause of action.238 Such payouts are not without controversy, 
like all else in the class action realm. Other commentators have raised the issue 
whether litigation should be permitted at all under circumstances where no single 
person actually cares enough to bring the litigation without first receiving an 
incentive payout entirely unrelated to the harm suffered by that person.239 At least 
one court has expressed skepticism at the contradiction between the named 
plaintiffs claiming that recovery at trial would be small enough to discourage 
individual actions while simultaneously alleging a justified recovery of thousands of 
dollars on their behalf.240 Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been an explosion 
of such causes of action.241  
Given the popularity of these class actions and the nationwide character of the 
harm, it makes sense that such class actions should at least be in federal court. 
Making deceptive advertising automatically a federal cause of action, in which the 
federal courts preempt the states’ ability to recognize it, may be one option to 
improve the system. Currently, the Lanham Act is limited only to competitors, 
which keeps these deceptive advertising actions out of the federal courts where they 
should probably belong.242 This was originally done to protect federal courts from a 
 238. McCoy et al., supra note 78, at 36 (citing Grosso v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 983 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008)); Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 649 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (approving incentive payouts 
totaling $6,000); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC., 2011 WL 2650711, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 
2011) (proposing incentive payouts of $5,000 for each named plaintiff); In re Ky. Grilled Chicken Coupon 
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 280 F.R.D. 364, 373 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (approving an aggregate incentive payment 
of $25,000 for five named plaintiffs); Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 564, 572 (S.D. Iowa 2011) 
(approving inventive payments of $3,000 for each named plaintiff). These incentive payments may be behind 
the phenomenon of the “serial plaintiff,” which occurs when one party serves as the named plaintiff in multiple 
class action litigations. See, e.g., Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 534 (C.D. Cal. 2011), 
reconsideration denied, 280 F.R.D. 540 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that Bruno was a plaintiff in another class action 
litigation); Montanez v. Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, No. CV 09–7420 DSF (DTBx), 2011 WL 6757875, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (stating that the plaintiff class had a parallel law suit against the Defendant’s 
competitor). 
 239. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 76 (noting an advantage of class actions is that “[t]hey allow lawsuits to be 
brought to right a wrong where the interest of no single plaintiff would justify initiation of a lawsuit” and that a 
disadvantage of class actions is that “they allow lawsuits to be brought when the interest of no single plaintiff 
would justify a lawsuit”).  
 240. See Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (“While it is true that the settlement contemplates awards of $5 
and $40 to class members who return a claim form, the named plaintiffs seek $5,000, a considerably higher 
amount. If this $5,000 figure represents a potential recovery at trial, then the class’s claims may be large enough 
to justify individual actions.”). 
 241. See John P. Hooper, How Class Action Litigations Have Changed Advertising Campaigns, 1083 PLI/PAT 
255, 257 (Mar. 2012) (citing Campbell’s Labeling Fight Feared to Embolden Class-Action Attorneys, 
AdvertisingAge (May 8, 2011)); see also id. at 258 (“The landscape has changed in light of the hyper-scrutiny of 
the plaintiffs’ bar of any and all claims made regarding product efficacy.”). 
 242. See Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et 
seq. (2006)); see also Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971); Serbin v. Ziebart 
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flood of litigation — a concern CAFA shows is no longer pressing.243 Some 
defendants have argued successfully244 that consumer complaints about deceptive or 
misleading advertising have been preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act245 and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990.246 Allowing such 
preemption would allow federal law to occupy the field. Nationwide classes could 
be certified more easily and the litigations could be resolved more efficiently. 
However, most plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in making this argument.247  
Even if the federal statutes were altered to preempt state deceptive advertising 
causes of action explicitly, the question remains whether or not Rule 23 is equipped 
to handle these cases at all. Class actions were never designed to address deceptive 
advertising style causes of action. The notes to Rule 23 indicate that it was 
contemplated to be of use in situations such as actions by shareholders against a 
corporation; actions by bondholders against the bond’s municipality; 
discrimination actions brought by the discriminated class; and antitrust and 
licensing disputes.248 When Rule 23 was overhauled in 1966, the committee 
contemplated the challenges of using the rule to vindicate a vast fraudulent act:  
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar 
misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it 
may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate 
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On 
the other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be 
unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in 
the. . . kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were 
addressed.249  
Int’l Corp., No. 92-1762, 1992 WL 415248, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999)); Hooper, supra note 241, at 260 
(citing Kelli L. Sager, Recent Developments in Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and Other Content-Based Claims, 
1069 PLI/PAT 15, 44 (Nov. 2011)). 
 243. See, e.g., Andreeva, supra note 43, at 390 (stating that CAFA gave federal courts original jurisdiction 
over large class action lawsuits). 
 244. See Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 10-00927 MMM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *9–10 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 14, 2011). 
 245. 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (2006). 
 246. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r), et seq. (2006). 
 247. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336–42 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court 
decision that the cause of action was preempted by the FDCA); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Beverage, 268 F.R.D. 
365, 372 (“Although . . . the regulations promulgated by the FDA may raise an inference that federal law 
preempts individual state laws governing food labeling, defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate 
‘clear and manifest’ intent by Congress to occupy the entire field of food labeling so as to preempt state 
consumer protection laws which are traditionally within the realm of state police power.”). 
 248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1937 (2006), advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006). 
 249. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note 1966 (2006) (amending subdivision (b)(3)) (citing 
Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944); Miller v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 166 F.2d 
723, 728 (2d Cir. 1948); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952); Sturgeon v. Great 
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In fact, some state causes of action for deceptive advertising, perhaps recognizing 
the undesirability of the class action vehicle, preclude class actions altogether.250  
It may make the most sense to fully restore deceptive advertising to its 
government regulatory roots. The major benefit to a class action, as commentators 
have noted, is the fact that it encourages consumers to act as private attorneys 
general.251 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “The aggregation of individual 
claims in the context of a class-wide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence 
of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”252 But is there any 
need for such activity in a field as heavily regulated as advertising already is? What 
does the existence of a private cause of action for deceptive advertising actually 
accomplish that is of use in society? The persistently small number of consumers 
bothering to claim their damages for such acts seems to indicate a general 
indifference to the lawsuit from the very people whose interests it is supposedly 
vindicating.253  
The reasoning behind separate state consumer protection laws makes little sense 
in the modern day and age. Courts have attempted to continue to defend these 
laws, pointing to each state’s individual interests in making sure its consumers are 
protected.254 However, in defending choice of law principles that permit each state 
to establish protection for its consumers, the courts merely highlight the absurdity 
of the system. As the courts note, it is possible for companies to pick and choose the 
consumer protection laws they prefer by locating where the consumer protection 
laws are most lax.255 In the same way, the converse is true: it is possible for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to pick and choose where to bring causes of action based on where the 
consumer protection laws are most favorable. One court queried: 
Does anyone think that, if State A opted to attract telemarketing companies 
to its borders by diluting or for that matter eliminating any regulation of 
Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1944)). Interestingly, the committee also raised reservations about 
mass tort actions, another favorite class action of today. See id. 
 250. See Hooper, supra note 241, at 260 (citing Ryan P. O’Quinn & Thomas Watterson, Fair Is Fair: 
Reshaping Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 307 n.86 (2011)); 
Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 597–98 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“Louisiana, 
Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, Virginia and Alabama prohibit class actions that allege unfair trade practices 
under state law.”); Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that “some 
states do not permit class actions under their consumer protection laws”). 
 251. See Ellis, supra note 41, at 111. 
 252. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
 253. Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC., 2011 WL 2650711, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) 
(noting that “average claims submission rates . . . are typically ten percent or less”). 
 254. See Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 946–47 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Mazza, 666 
F.3d at 591 (“Consumer protection laws are a creature of the state in which they are fashioned. They may 
impose or not impose liability depending on policy choices made by state legislatures or, if legislators left a gap 
or ambiguity, by state supreme courts.”). 
 255. See Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 947. 
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them, the policy makers of State B would be comfortable with the 
application of the “consumer-protection” laws of State A to their residents 
— the denizens of State B?256  
But the absurdity of this outcome is rooted in the presupposition that consumer 
protection laws should be merely statewide in scope. In this age of nationwide 
advertising campaigns, the continuing statewide nature of deceptive advertising 
causes of action not only seems inefficient but also seems to play little role in the 
pursuit of anything approaching justice. One court chided a Defendant, “Try as it 
might, General Mills cannot evade the unmistakable fact that the objective — and 
realization — of its marketing campaign was to present Yo-Plus to Florida 
consumers as a product that . . . aids in the promotion of digestive health.”257 But 
that was not Defendant’s objective. Defendant’s objective was to present it that way 
to U.S. consumers.258 The courts raise the specter of the ridiculousness of one state’s 
consumer protection statute covering the entire nation.259 But the courts have hit on 
the problem: both plaintiffs and defendants seem to behave as if they desire this to 
be the case, favoring nationwide classes in many instances, and the lack of a 
nationwide consumer protection law is harming judicial efficiency and consumer 
protection precedent.260  
Another oft-cited purpose of class actions is to deter corporate action (rather 
than compensate for individual harm).261 However, most of the deceptive 
advertising class actions have been aimed at industries whose advertisements are 
already government-regulated.262 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
approved many of the advertisements that are sought to be vindicated by deceptive 
advertising causes of action. Oversight and regulation by federal agencies is the best 
vehicle for fixing these shortcomings.263 The federal courts have implied as much, 
 256. Id. 
 257. Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 687, 697 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 258. Id. at 691. 
 259. See Pilgrim, 660 F.3d at 947 (“[T]he idea that ‘one state’s law would apply to claims by consumers 
throughout the country—not just those in Indiana, but also those in California, New Jersey, and Mississippi—is 
a novelty.’” (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002))).  
 260. See id. at 948 (acknowledging that different consumer protection laws can require corporations to 
have to use different advertisements in each state).  
 261. See Andreeva, supra note 43, at 400 (“[C]lass actions do not exist only to provide relief for private 
wrongs – another major purpose behind them is to correct, punish, and deter big corporations.”) (citing David 
L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924 (1998); 151 CONG. 
REC. H736 (daily ed. Feb. 17 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott); id. at H751 (2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee)). 
 262. See Hooper, supra note 241, at 257.  
 263. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 508–09 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (“The FDA should be given a chance to opine on the proper labeling before a Lanham Act suit is 
filed . . . since it has more experience with consumers’ understanding of drug labels than judges do.”). 
Stacey M. Lantagne 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 155
stepping aside when the issue in dispute intruded on the FDA’s territory.264 So 
closely related are the FDA’s actions to deceptive advertising class actions, it seems 
as if some class actions spring up as a result of the FDA action alerting the 
consumers (or attorneys) to the problem.265 Defendants raise defenses based on 
FDA requirements.266 If the FDA explicitly does not consider a label problematic, 
why should defendant be prosecuted for it? Even the Better Business Bureau has 
some power over advertising campaigns, spurring changes when its National 
Advertising Division concludes a statement is deceptive or misleading.267 
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been granted broad 
powers to regulate deceptive advertising268 and has been active in this mission, 
providing a “comprehensive policy statement on ‘deception,’ its elements and how 
it is to be evaluated.”269 Basically, the FTC itself has the power “to bring a class 
action” on behalf of consumers injured by deceptive advertising.270 Courts have 
already acknowledged the vital influence of the FTC’s regulations on private 
deceptive advertising causes of action.271 And, like the FDA, the FTC sometimes 
seems to flag deceptive advertising cases for private plaintiffs.272 Perhaps it would be 
appropriate to move deceptive advertising back into the realm it was initially in: less 
a private cause of action and more a matter for the government to handle.273  
 264. See id; see also All One God Faith, Inc. v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1450 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (stepping aside in favor of allowing the United States Department of Agriculture to exercise its 
regulatory role properly). 
 265. See, e.g., In re Yasmin and Yaz Mktg. Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09–md–02100–
DRH–PMF, 2012 WL 865041, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2012) (stating that the FDA issued a warning letter to the 
defendant concerning deceptive advertisements); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., No. C 10-01192 JSW, 2011 WL 
2221113, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2011) (finding an FDA issued warning letter to be one of the factors that 
instigated the suit).  
 266. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Coca–Cola concludes issues 
of proximate cause and actual deception under the Consumer Fraud Act require individual determinations 
precluding typicality and class certification.”). 
 267. See Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that the Better 
Business Bureau’s National Advertising Division found that the defendant’s advertising claims were not 
supported.). 
 268. See FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 269. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 27:117. 
 270. Id. at § 27:118. 
 271. See, e.g., B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s the 
administrative agency charged with preventing unfair trade practices, the Commission’s assessment of what 
constitutes deceptive advertising commands deference from the judiciary.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bayer Corp., No. 4:07CV00017 JMM, 2009 WL 2424352, at *1. (E.D. Ark. Aug. 
6, 2009) (noting that the FTC issued an order to stop Defendant from making unsubstantiated representations 
prior to Plaintiff suing). 
 273. Even some states initially saw deceptive advertising as a cause of action belonging to the state, not the 
consumer. See Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (discussing how the Illinois 
Consumer Fraud Act only provided for prosecutions by the state attorney general until 1973, when a private 
cause of action was added to the statute). 
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CAFA itself seems in favor of more government regulation of class actions in 
general.274 Maybe deceptive advertising class actions should take this impulse one 
step further and belong entirely to the government.  
VI. Conclusion 
For many years now, deceptive advertising class actions have enjoyed 
unprecedented popularity.275 However, the state law nature of the cause of action 
has led to persistent problems.276 The morass of settlement approval, inconsistent 
precedent, limited statewide classes, and jurisdictional acrobatics have resulted in 
inefficiency for plaintiffs, defendants, and courts — even after CAFA.277 It would be 
better for deceptive advertising to leave behind fractured state statutes and tangled 
class action procedure and return to the regulatory realm of its roots.278 
 274. See Erichson, supra note 45, at 1597 n.21 (noting that CAFA “requires notice of proposed class 
settlements to government authorities”). 
 275. See supra Part I. 
 276. See supra Parts III.B–C. 
 277. See supra Part IV. 
 278. See supra Part V. 
